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et al.: Book Review

Book Review
THE CoNsrrurrxoN AND SocIo-EcoNoMIc CHANGE. By Henry Rottschaefer. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1948. Pp. xvi, 253. $3.50.
This volume contains Professor Rottschaefer's lectures at the University
of Michigan, the first of the series honoring the memory of a great lawyer, Thomas
M. Cooley. In a foreword, Dean Stason observes that Judge Cooley recognized
that the Constitution "must and does possess a realistic flexibility" (this being
based upon a conversation quoted by James Bryce) but at the same time cites'
the following from Judge Cooley's ConstitutionalLimitations:

"A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time,
and another at some subsequent time when the circumstances may have
so changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable
.... The violence of public passion is quite as likely to be in the direction
of oppression as in any other; and the necessity for bills of rights in our
fundamental laws lies mainly in the danger that the legislature will be
influenced, by temporary excitements and passions among the people, to
adopt oppressive enactments ... The meaning of the constitution is fixed
when it is adopted, and is no different at any subsequent time when a
court has occasion to pass upon it."
However Judge Cooley might have regarded the constitutional impasse in
which the New Deal found itself in 1936, it is certain that he would have been
intensely interested in the matters dealt with by Professor Rottschaefer. No
observer of constitutional government could fail to be. Here is an analysis-acute,
lucidly written, and in the main dispassionate-of the constitutional revision in the
crisis induced by the Depression. The extent of the revision already made is perhaps
greater than most of us remember, but Professor Rottschaefer considers it quite
likely that "the changes discussed will prove to define only the minimum scope
of constitutional revision that will occur before the process of adaptation achieves
a recognizable degree of stable equilibrium." The end of the reconstruction period
is not yet in sight.
Professor Rottschaefer first traces the development of federal powers prior to
1933. In the lines of authority so developed the Supreme Court found the major
tools available for the task of revision which commenced in 1937. He then deals with
the expansion of federal powers since 1933 (a gigantic spectacle which most of us
can now regard with more equanimity than we could ten years ago), and demonstrates that "the greater part of recent changes" was effected not so much by the
express overruling of prior decisions as by adapting accepted principles to changed
conditions in which new factors demanded recognition. A "congeries of principles"
1. At pp. xi-xii.
(111)
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relating to federal powers, whose ultimate implications were not wholly consistent,
had been developed prior to 1933 and there was nothing to compel the selection
of some of these principles, rather than others, as major premises in the new situation. With the clarity resulting from a distinguished style Professor Rottschaefer
traces the historical background for the decisions upholding the National Labor
Relations Act, 2 the power of Congress to fix prices for interstate sales under the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 3 the Fair Labor Standards Act,4 the
Public Utility Holding Company Act,5 the Agricultural Marketing Act," the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 the TVA and Federal Power Commission Acts,8 and the
Social Security Act.9 These decisions, which have brought about the greater part
of the expansion of the federal commerce power and the federal taxing power,
reveal, Professor Rottschaefer says, 10
"the processes by which the Constitution has been adapted to changes in
political, social and economic philosophies, and to the progressive integration of the national economy. The Court had a certain body of principles
with which to work. It could use, modify, or discard any or all of them,
or choose from among them those it deemed best fitted for what it conceived to be its task. In fact, it employed all these methods."
Professor Rottschaefer next deals with the expansion of state powers since
1933 and undertakes to explain the apparent paradox that these powers should
have expanded even though, when they collide with expanded federal powers, it
is the latter which are supreme. This is perhaps the least valuable section of an
admirable book. While Professor Rottschaefer apparently agrees that the chief
expansion has been in the states' taxing powers, he implies that there has been
substantial expansion of their regulatory powers also. To this observer the expansion of state powers seems, with rare and economically insubstantial exceptions,
to have been limited to the taxing powers, and to have been motivated by the same
principle which motivates Congressional grants-in-aid to the states, now expanded
to astronomical figures. The advance of federal power into fields which formerly
belonged to the states, but from which they are now excluded,1l seems to have
2. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1 (1937); Associated
Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U. S. 103 (1937); Polish National Alliance v. N.L.R.B.,
322 U. S.643 (1944), and others.

3. United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S.533 (1939).
4. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S.100 (1941).

5. Electric Bond & Share Co. v. S.E.C., 303 U. S.419 (1938); North American Co. v. S.E.C., 327 U. S.686 (1946); and American Power & Light Co. v.
S.E.C., 329 U. S.90 (1946).
6. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S.38 (1939).
7. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S.111 (1942).
8. Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U. S. 288 (1936); United States v. City &
County of San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16 (1940); United States v. Appalachin Electric
Power Co., 311 U. S.377 (1940); and Oklahoma v. G. F. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S.
508 (1941), were the most important of these.
9. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S.548 (1937).
10. At p. 94.
11. See, e.g., A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, 520 (1942);
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U. S.533 (1944). South-
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made some financial compensation expedient. The need of the states for revenue
has also, as Professor Rottschaefer points out,12 much increased. While the commerce clause now invalidates vast areas of state regulation, it has lost some at
least of its former vigor in invalidating state taxation. Professor Rottschaefer's
careful analysis of the tax cases, in the light of the pre-1933 precedents, is instructive.
A separate section deals with protection of personal and property rights, a
major part of the discussion being devoted to the changes relating to the regulation of economic activities, both of capital and labor. Professor Rottschaefer concludes that it is a fair interpretation of the decisions that the scope of the due
process clauses since 1933 has been both expanded and contracted.
"They no longer afford the interest of property and business the protection
they once did. On the other hand, the interests of labor are receiving
greater protection, particularly those of its activities that may be viewed
as exercises of the workers' personal liberty."13
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which had never been
so restrictively construed as the due process clause, also appears now to permit
wider state action than formerly.14
Professor Rottschaefer concludes that since 1933 the Court "has so construed the constitution as to sustain a great expansion of federal powers, a relaxation of important limitations on state powers, an acceptance of a more extensive
and intensive regulation of business, and an increase in the protection of personal
liberty in areas other than business." He considers it extremely unlikely that there
will be any general retreat from these positions in the forseeable future. The real
question is how much further these trends are likely to be carried. Professor
Rottschaefer points out that we have taken only the first steps toward government
planning for the national economy, and there has thus far been no general threat to
civil and political liberties, "other than the economic of one important economic
group." Indeed, the period since 1933 has been marked by "vigorus judicial protection of other civil liberties and of political rights." And he rightly observes that
the more that economic freedom is curtailed, the greater the value that freedom of
speech and press and of religion acquire. He regards "the danger that modem
liberalism may spawn a tyrannous totalitarianism" as real.
To this reviewer that danger, in the United States, seems neither clear nor
present. But it is not necessary to regard it as immediately threatening in order
to agree that the vast expansion of governmental power, which has brought within
em Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761 (1945); Morgan v. Virginia. 328 U. S.373
(1946); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S.218 (1947); Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767 (1947).
See, also Note, 'Occupation of the Field' in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-1946:
Ten Years of Federalism, 60 HARv. L. REv. 262 (1946); and Green, The Supreme
Court, The Bill of Rights and the States, 97 U. of PA. L. REv. 608, 614-615 (1949).

12. At p. 107.
13. At pp. 199-200.
14. Cf. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 (1940), with Connolly v. Union Sewer
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its orbit almost every subject of concern to mankind, requires enforcement of the
First Amendment freedoms (and also of the rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions) to the furthest extent compatible with public order. Legislation is the
result of politics; and politics-like its extension, war-has tended to become
total. Greater scope for these fundamental rights and freedoms seems to be a
necessary corollary.1 5
It is really extraordinary that those who consider that the Fair Deal is murdering free enterprise should not at once perceive that they have a large stake in the
maintenance of freedom of speech and of the press, of the free exercise of religion
and of the rights of the accused. The truth is that we all have. And the stake
becomes larger with each new advance of federal power, alike for those who regard
the advance as necessary and for those who look upon it as socialistic tyranny.
The liberty of each of us can be no greater than the rights of the Communists, of
Gerald L. K. Smith and Arthur Terminiello, of Jehovah's Witnesses, of the doomed
prisoner in Betts v. Brady.16 Our freedom stands or falls with theirs.
JOHN RAEBURN GREEN

Member of the Missouri Bar
St. Louis, Missouri

Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1902). See also Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Commissioners, 330 U. S. 552 (1947).
15. See Green, op. cit. supra n. 11, at 615-619, 634.
16. 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
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